

# Price of Long-Run Temperature Shifts in Capital Markets

by Bansal, Kiku, and Ochoa

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Discussion by Ric Colacito



THE UNIVERSITY  
*of* NORTH CAROLINA  
*at* CHAPEL HILL

## A quote from the paper

"We focus on potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change [...] not limited to rising sea levels and drowning of currently populated coastlines and islands, intensified heat waves, severe droughts, storms and floods, destruction of ecosystems and wildlife, spreading of contagious tropical diseases, shortages of food and fresh water supply, significant destruction of property and human losses."

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- Trailer for this paper

## Theoretical contribution

- Representative agent has recursive preferences

$$U_t = (1 - \delta) \log C_t + \delta \theta \log E_t \exp \left\{ \frac{U_{t+1}}{\theta} \right\}$$

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where  $\theta = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} < 0$ . If  $\theta \rightarrow -\infty$ : Expected Utility case.

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where  $\theta = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} < 0$ . **Conditional Moments matter.**



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- probability and size depend on temperature
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- Disasters are a source of uncertainty and skewness
  - **Social cost (marginal utility) of emissions is large**

# Empirical contribution

- Temperature provides **news** about future probability and extent of disasters
- With EZ preferences, news shocks are **priced**
- There is **a risk premium** to compensate for temperature risk exposure
- In the **cross-section**, industries that are more exposed to temperature risk should command a larger premium

# Comments

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- 1 Assessing the calibration
- 2 Measuring climate exposure
- 3 Medium-Run Risk
- 4 Connection between model and empirical analysis

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
## Example: probability of AMOC collapse

- Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation
- A large scale ocean circulation that flows northward near the surface in the Atlantic, sinks in cold high northern latitudes and returns to the Southern Ocean.
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- How likely is the collapse of the AMOC?

## Experts' (Dis)Agreement



**Source:** Zickfeld et al. (Climate Change, 2007)




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Temperature anomaly  $> 2^{\circ}$  triggers positive disaster probability


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
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$$\left. \begin{aligned} d &= 0.0011 * 4 + 0.0011 * 4^2 = 2.2\% \\ \pi &= 0.0050 + 0.0033 * 4 = 1.82\% \end{aligned} \right\}$$

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## Calibration: thoughts

- **Probability** of a climate related disaster is very ambiguous
- This paper seems to be on the conservative side
- How to benchmark the **size** of the disaster?
- Is Barro the right reference for this?
- How confident are actual investors about these projections?

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- Standard & Poor, 2012 Industry Outlook

"Looking ahead, we believe **higher catastrophe losses**, a relatively weak macroeconomic environment, lower investment yields and the tapering off of the benefit of reserve releases **are likely to weigh on profitability for the overall P/C industry**"

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
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- Same logic of the empirical analysis of the paper should apply to the **cross-section of regional real estate**

# Exposure using impact on industry GDP



**Source:** Colacito, Hoffmann, and Phan (2016)

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

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  - lowering their risk exposure to policies that place a price on carbon
  - reallocating capital to deliver higher returns in a low-carbon economy
- Substantial uncertainty on projected extent of incremental adoption of this policy going forward

# Carbon Pricing

## Companies pricing vs. not pricing, by GICS sector



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Equivalently, can we cast the problem as one of (temperature related) **tax uncertainty**?

## Connection between model and data

- Spell out connection between representative agent/single good model and cross-sectional analysis
- What is the parametric connection between the cross-sectional risk-premium of high/low exposed sectors and deeper model's parameters?
- How large is the differential impact of climate disasters?
- Can you connect it to micro evidence?

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President Barack Obama, during Farewell speech in Chicago